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Commission’s	 clearance	 of	 the	 transaction.	 This	 deal	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 complete	
division	of	business	areas	between	the	two	most	powerful	German	energy	groups,	Eon	
and	 RWE.	While	 Eon	will	 concentrate	 on	 sales	 and	 distribution	 grid	 operations,	 RWE	
will	 take	 over	 the	 conventional	 power	 plants	 of	 its	 former	 competitor	 as	 well	 as	 all	
renewable	power	generation	facilities.	RWE	will	also	take	back	all	the	power	generation	
facilities	 initially	 sold	 to	 Innogy	 about	 two	 years	 ago	 and	will	 receive	 a	 16.7	 percent	
stake	 in	 Eon	 Corporation.	 To	 this	 end	 the	 German	 Federal	 Cartel	 Office	 (In	 German:	
Bundeskartellamt,	 BKartA)	 announced	 already	 on	 26	 February	 2019	 that	 it	 considers	




EU	 Commission	 approval	 in	 September	 2019	 is	 a	 "decision	 of	 enormous	 importance"	
that	will	"fundamentally	change	the	entire	sector"4.	The	result	of	this	decision	is	that	this	
mega-deal	 creates	 two	 monolithic	 giants	 in	 the	 German	 energy	 sector	 with	
unprecedented	market	 power.	 If	 one	 compares	 the	 situation	with	 the	purchase	 of	 the	
electricity	 supplier	 Nuon	 by	 Vattenfall	 in	 2009,	 questions	 arise.	 Back	 then,	 the	
competition	authorities	forced	Vattenfall	to	divest	parts	of	Nuon's	business	in	individual	
cities,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 supplier	 “lekker	 energie“.	 Following	 this	 example,	 the	
competition	authorities	should	have	consistently	forced	Eon	to	sell	parts	of	the	business,	
such	as	larger	distribution	companies.	
A	transaction	of	 this	magnitude	should	always	be	viewed	critically	 in	competition	 law.	
The	 legitimate	 question	 therefore	 arises	 as	 to	 why	 the	 German	 and	 European	
competition	 authorities	 (the	 Federal	 Cartel	 Office,	 the	 Federal	 Network	 Agency,	 the	















requirements.	 "Competition	doubts	 are	 certainly	 justified"5.	 Because	 if	 the	 two	 largest	
German	 energy	 groups	 completely	 eliminate	 each	 other's	 competition	 and	 completely	
divide	 up	 their	 business	 areas	 among	 themselves,	 this	 will	 have	 far-reaching	
consequences	 for	 the	energy	sector.	Especially	against	 the	background	that	 the	energy	
transition	 in	 Germany	 has	 so	 far	 been	 characterised	 by	 decentralised	 structures	 and	





By	breaking	up	 Innogy,	Eon	becomes	by	 far	 the	 largest	electricity	and	gas	distribution	
network	 operator	 in	 Germany.	 As	 our	 calculations	 and	 research	 shows	 (see	 figure),	
almost	 56	 percent	 of	 the	 total	 of	 14,000	 electricity	 distribution	 grid	 concessions	 will	
then	be	in	the	hands	of	Eon.6	In	addition,	Eon	will	 in	future	own	over	45	percent	of	all	
6,000	 gas	 distribution	 network	 concessions.7	This	 will	 further	 shift	 the	 existing	
asymmetries	 in	the	awarding	competition	in	favour	of	Eon.	As	a	result	competition	for	
the	 award	 of	 distribution	 grid	 concessions	 will	 become	 more	 difficult	 for	 competing	
suppliers	 because	 they	 will	 have	 to	 compete	 with	 a	 very	 powerful	 Eon	 Group	 in	 the	
future.	 Eon	 can	 now	 also	 draw	 on	 the	 negotiating	 know-how	 of	 the	 former	 RWE	
subsidiary	of	the	large	grid	operator	Westnetz.	In	this	way,	the	strategies	that	preserve	
the	 company's	 ownership	 can	 be	 applied	 even	 more	 consistently	 in	 the	 tough	
competition	 for	 Eon's	 distribution	 grid	 concessions 8 	vis-à-vis	 competitors.	 The	


































































































































































































9	 Municipal	 utilities	 as	 an	 important	 competitive	 corrective	 measure	 are	
weakened	by	the	decision	of	the	cartel	authorities	













bound	 energy,	 Eon	 dominates	 the	 German	 sales	 market	 for	 electricity	 and	 gas.	 This	
means,	for	example,	that	wherever	Eon	acts	as	a	basic	supplier,	above-average	electricity	
and/or	gas	tariffs	can	be	realized.	In	Germany,	the	company	with	the	most	customers	in	
the	 local	 distribution	 network	 is	 the	 basic	 supplier.	 It	 has	 special	 duties	 but	 also	




It	 stands	 to	reason	that	 the	Eon/RWE	deal	will	 lead	 to	an	 increase	 in	cooperation	and	
joint	municipal	undertakings	among	cities	and	municipalities.	For	it	can	be	assumed	that	
more	 and	more	municipalities	 will	 no	 longer	 be	 prepared	 to	 leave	 their	 local	 energy	




existing	municipal	utilities	 in	 the	distribution	grid	business	 is	not	 to	be	expected,	as	 it	




Based	 off	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 RWE	 and	 Innogy,	 the	 company	 was	 closer	 to	 the	
municipalities	 and	 their	 political	 decision-makers	 than	 Eon	 due	 to	 close	 municipal	
political	ties.	Therefore,	market	observers	now	expect	several	municipalities	to	put	their	
concessions	 out	 to	 tender	 again	 and	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 remunicipalisations.	
Numerous	 cities	 and	municipalities	 are	 already	 trying	 to	 determine	whether	 they	 can	




contract	 between	 the	municipality	 and	 the	 energy	 supplier.	 This	 gives	 the	 city,	 as	 the	
grantor	 of	 the	 concession,	 a	 special	 right	 of	 termination.	 After	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	
concession	agreement,	due	to	a	change	of	ownership	for	example,	another	company	(in	
this	 case	 Eon	 instead	 of	 RWE)	 can	 exercise	 a	 dominant	 influence	 on	 the	 distribution	
system	 operator	 as	 a	 special	 right	 of	 termination	 can	 arise.	 It	 can	 then	 either	
remunicipalise	 the	 distribution	 grid,	 look	 for	 another	 distribution	 grid	 operator	 or,	 in	
the	 case	 of	 an	 existing	 semi-public	 company	 (with	 a	 former	 RWE	 or	 Innogy	





The	 economic	 reasons	 for	 the	Eon/RWE	deal	 are	 still	 lagging	behind.	The	 two	 largest	












a	 result,	 the	 profit	 trends	 and	 share	 prices	 of	 the	 two	 groups	 were	 caught	 in	 an	
unstoppable	 downward	 spiral	 (see	 graph).	 Between	 2009	 and	 2019,	 Eon	 and	 RWE	
suffered	 the	 biggest	 stock	market	 losses	 in	 their	 corporate	 history.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	








The	 losses	 in	 value	 were	 particularly	 high	 for	 large	 financial	 investors	 such	 as	
BlackRock,	 who	 owns	 significant	 share	 packages	 from	 both	 German	 energy	 groups.	
BlackRock	currently	holds	a	6.5	percent	stake18	in	Eon	and	a	5.95	percent	stake	in	RWE.	
The	US	 financial	 investor	 has	 lost	 the	 equivalent	 of	US$1.089	billion	 over	 the	 last	 ten	
years	 through	 its	RWE	stake	alone.	 In	 the	case	of	Eon,	BlackRock	even	had	 to	19accept	
losses	of	2.184	billion	US	dollars	in	the	same	period.	
	
BlackRock,	who	regularly	 invites	 the	management	boards	of	RWE	and	Eon	 to	 their	US	

















































models	 of	Eon	 and	RWE	had	 to	 change	 as	quickly	 as	possible	 in	 terms	of	 competitive	
strategy	 and	 value	 creation.	 And	 in	 such	 common	 ownership	 constellations,	 major	
investors	 like	 BlackRock	 pay	 less	 attention	 to	 the	 individual	 performance	 of	 their	
shareholdings	 and	 more	 to	 the	 overall	 economic	 development	 of	 both	 groups.	 This	
means	 that	 the	 "interest	 in	 the	 total	 market	 return	 is	 in	 the	 foreground"22.	 Common	
ownership	investors23	24	are	also	keen	to	defuse	the	competitive	and	rivalry	situations	of	
the	 groups	 concerned.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 profit	 margins,	 dividend	 payments	 and	 share	
price	 development	 of	 both	 groups	 can	be	 improved	 sustainably.25		 In	 this	 context,	 the	
following	 facts	are	also	questionable:	 as	only	about	40	percent	of	 the	voting	 capital	 is	
usually	 present	 at	 an	 Eon	 shareholders'	 meeting,	 RWE	 has	 almost	 a	majority	 of	 16.7	
percent.	If	the	power	plant	operator	RWE	reaches	an	agreement	with	the	US	investment	
company	Blackrock,	RWE	could	control	the	shareholders'	meeting	of	 its	customer	Eon.	




The	Eon/RWE	deal	 to	break	up	 Innogy,	which	was	already	announced	 in	March	2018,	
should	 not	 have	 been	 approved	 by	 the	 EU	 Competition	 Commission	 for	 competition	
reasons.	 The	 German	 supervisory	 authorities	 should	 not	 have	 accepted	 the	 complete	
division	 of	 business	 between	 Eon	 and	 RWE.	 Instead	 there	 were	 indications	 from	 the	
German	 Federal	 Cartel	 Office	 and	 the	 Monopolies	 Commission	 that	 the	 deal	 did	 not	





































If	 the	 German	 Cartel	 Office,	 the	 Federal	 Network	 Agency	 and	 the	 Monopolies	
Commission	 remain	 inactive	 in	 such	mega-deals,	 this	 is	 also	 a	 sign	 of	 the	 neo-liberal	
economic	policy	that	has	been	postulated	and	pursued	by	federal	policy	since	the	1990s.	
Privatisation,	 deregulation,	 wage	 restraint,	 tax	 cuts,	 a	 lean	 state	 and	 the	 interests	 of	
large	companies	increasingly	determine	the	economic	policy	compass27.	For	example,	in	
February	2019,	Federal	Minister	of	Economics	Altmaier	called	 for	the	"lowering	of	 the	





In	 view	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Eon/RWE	 deal	 described	 above,	 municipal	 utilities	 in	
Germany	should	not	accept	the	decision	of	the	EU	Competition	Commission	taken	within	
the	framework	of	merger	control.	It	is	therefore	advisable	to	take	legal	action	against	the	
approval	 of	 EU	 Competition	 Commissioner	 Margrethe	 Vestager	 and	 to	 join	 the	
announced	legal	action	of	Mainvoa.	Municipalities	that	have	a	change-of-control	clause	
in	their	contracts	should	examine	whether	and	to	what	extent	they	can	make	use	of	it.	In	
addition,	 cities	 and	 municipalities	 will	 in	 future	 have	 the	 opportunity	 (when	 the	
concession	 agreements	 expire)	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 market	 power	 of	 the	 new	 Eon	
Group.	 Medium-sized	 and	 small	 municipalities	 also	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 transfer	
local	 energy	 supply	 into	 their	 own	 hands	 by	 establishing	 a	 joint	 distribution	 grid	
company	 (remunicipalisation)	 in	 the	 electricity	 and/or	 gas	 sector	 and	 to	 perceive	 the	
energy	turnaround	as	a	municipal	task	of	shaping	public	value.29	
	
	
27	Lobbypedia	(website):	Neoliberalism	-	Role	of	the	State,	available	online	at:	
https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Neoliberalismus#Rolle_des_Staates;	call	for	proposals	of	26.10.2019.	
28	Handelsblatt	of	05.02.2019:	This	is	the	new	industrial	policy	strategy	of	Minister	of	Economics	Altmaier;	
available	online	at:	https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/wirtschaftspolitik-das-ist-die-
neue-industriepolitische-strategie-von-wirtschaftsminister-altmaier/23950112.html?ticket=ST-
51806870-h6tXwpAlgs6mFtrOEdbq-ap4;	call	of	26.10.2019		
29	Berlo,	K.;	Templin,	W.	&	Wagner,	O.:	Remunicipalisation	as	an	Instrument	for	Local	Climate	Strategies	in	
Germany:	The	Conditions	of	the	Legal	Energy	Framework	as	an	Obstacle	for	the	Local	Energy	Transition,	
in:	Renewable	Energy	Law	and	Policy	Review,	Vol.	7,	No.	2	(2016),	pp.	113-121;	available	online	at:	
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:wup4-opus-65223	
